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THE SCOPE OF PURCHASE AND SALE UNDER RULE lob-5
Northland Capital Corp. v. Silver, 735 F.2d 1421 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
In Northland Capital Corp. v. Silver,1 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit narrowly interpreted the fed-
eral securities laws, employing strict tenets of contract law to define
purchase and sale under rule lOb-5. 2
Northland Capital Corporation ("Northland"), as part of a consor-
tium of investors, agreed to transfer capital to Watkins Corporation
("Watkins") in exchange for interest and securities.3 Prior to closing,
Northland deposited funds in Watkins' bank account.' At the closing,
Watkins proposed to use the financing in a manner to which Northland
had not previously agreed.' In addition, Northland suspected fraudu-
lently prepared financial statements.6  The transaction failed to close.7
Nevertheless, Watkins delivered the securities to Northland.8 When
Northland sought the return of its funds, Watkins was insolvent.9
1. 735 F.2d 1421 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
2. Rule lob-5 is limited to certain fraudulent activities undertaken "in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security." 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1985).
3. 735 F.2d at 1423-24. Watkins engaged A. David Silver & Co., a venture capital firm, to
raise capital to construct new franchise locations. Id. at 1423. Mr. Silver sent a memorandum
describing the investment and Watkins' financial position to numerous investment companies, in-
cluding Allied Capital Corporation ("Allied") and Northland. Id. Allied persuaded Northland and
several other firms to participate in the transaction. Id In consideration for their capital contribu-
tions, the investing companies were to receive stock warrants and interest on their investment. Id. at
1423-24.
4. Originally, Northland agreed to deposit its share of the funds into an escrow account in
accordance with Allied's instructions. Id at 1424. After failing to receive instructions from Allied,
Northland contacted Watkins. Id Watkins instructed Northland to transfer the funds directly to
Watkins' bank. Id. Northland complied, assuming the money was to be held in escrow until closing,
but the money ended up in Watkins' general corporate account. Id.
5. Northland contemplated an agreement restricting Watkins' use of the financing to con-
struct new restaurant franchise locations. Id. at 1423. Watkins proposed, however, to use 50% of
the funds received for working capital and 50% for construction of additional franchise locations.
Id. at 1424.
6. Allied expressed concern that an opinion letter purportedly prepared by Watkins' attorney
bore indications of a forgery. Id. Northland also expressed concern that the board of directors for
Watkins had failed to approve properly the contemplated transaction. Id.
7. Id.
8. The question whether the warrants issued by Watkins constituted securities for purposes of
rule lOb-5 was not addressed by the court. Id. at 1430. For a discussion of what types of instru-
ments constitute securities for purposes of rule lOb-5, see Jacobs, The Meaning of "Security" Under
Rule lOb-5, 29 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 211, 331-33 (1984).
9. Pursuant to Northland's request, Watkins agreed to return the funds. 735 F.2d at 1425.
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Northland brought suit' ° under section 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 ("1934 Act")' to recover the funds. The district
court granted summary judgment against Northland, concluding that
Northland was not a purchaser of securities. 2 On appeal, the District of
Columbia Circuit affirmed and held: Despite the physical exchange of
securities for money, a transaction is not a purchase and sale of securities
under rule 10b-5 when the parties fail to assent to the essential terms of
their agreement. 13
Congress passed the Securities Act of 1933 ("1933 Act")'4 and the
1934 Act in response to investor fraud that permeated the securities mar-
kets in the 1920s.' 5 In section 10(b)' 6 of the 1934 Act, Congress dele-
gated authority to the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") to
prescribe rules to prohibit deceptive practices.' 7
Although Congress failed to provide an express private cause of action
for violations of section 10(b), the courts quickly implied a private cause
of action. 8 In Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.,9 however, the Second
One month later, Watkins filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy, having failed to return the funds
to Northland. Id.
10. Northland Capital Corp. v. Silver, [1983 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
99,150, at 95,547 (D.D.C. March 30, 1983).
11. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-kk (1982).
12. 735 F.2d at 1422.
13. Id.
14. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1982).
15. See S. REP. No. 1455, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 81 (1934) (discussing intent and scope of securi-
ties laws); H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 6 (1934) (same); see also SEC v. Capital
Gains Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186-87 (1963) (fundamental purpose of federal securities laws is the
adoption of a full disclosure philosophy).
16. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982).
17. Congress realized that it could not foresee and thereby legislate against all possible fraudu-
lent securities practices. Congress thus provided the SEC with the authority to enact rules and
regulations as necessary. See H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1934). Pursuant to its
rulemaking authority, the SEC promulgated rule lOb-5.
18. In Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), a Pennsylvania
district court held that an implied private cause of action existed under § 10(b) and rule lOb-5. In
reaching its decision, the court cited § 286 of the Restatement of Torts as authority for the proposi-
tion that a statutory violation may serve as the basis of an action for damages by one for whom the
act was enacted to protect, absent legislative intent to withhold the right. Id. at 513. Finding that
no such intent was apparent for § 10(b), the court concluded that a private right of action existed.
Id.
The Supreme Court acquiesced in this widely accepted implied private right of action in 1971.
Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971) ("[fit is now well
established that a private right of action is implied under § 10(b)").
19. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
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Circuit sharply restricted this implied right.2 ° In Birnbaum, the plaintiff
shareholders brought a derivative suit, alleging violations of section 10(b)
and rule l0b-5.2 1 The court dismissed the plaintiffs' suit, holding that
only plaintiffs who purchase or sell securities may maintain an action
under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5.22
Although many courts adopted the Birnbaum doctrine,23 courts and
commentators expressed concern that the doctrine might unjustly deny
injured parties recourse to federal court.24 Accordingly, lower courts
developed exceptions to the strict purchaser-seller requirement.25
In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,26 the Supreme Court con-
20. Birnbaum and its effect upon later cases is discussed in detail in Note, Birnbaum: Revisited
and Triumphant-Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 25 DE PAUL L. REv. 132 (1975).
21. Defendant, the president of the company, rejected a merger offer from another company
that would have been very profitable to the shareholders. Birnbaum, 193 F.2d at 462. Instead, the
defendant sold his individual shares to another company at a substantial premium. Id. Plaintiffs
contended that defendant's fraudulent activity violated rule lOb-5. Id
22. Judge Augustus Hand's opinion for the court examined the SEC's intent in promulgating
rule 10b-5. Hand reasoned that the SEC did not intend to protect all investors from fraud, only
those who purchased or sold securities. 193 F.2d at 463. Hand argued that Congress directed
§ 10(b) solely at misrepresentation associated with the purchase or sale of securities rather than at
fraudulent corporate mismanagement. Il at 464. The Birnbaum court's holding is commonly re-
ferred to as the "Birnbaum doctrine" or the "purchaser-seller requirement."
23. See, eg., Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1974); Landy v. Federal
Deposit Ins. Corp., 486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974). But see Eason v.
General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974)
(rejecting the Birnbaum doctrine).
24. See Lowenfels, The Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for Rule 10b-5, 54 VA. L.
REv. 268, 275-77 (1968) (the Birnbaum doctrine appears incompatible with the broad spectrum of
private rights created under the federal securities laws); Ruder, Current Developments in the Federal
Law of Corporate Fiduciary Relations-Standing to Sue Under Rule 10b-5, 26 Bus. LAw. 1289
(1971) (the Birnbaum doctrine creates an inconsistent pattern of relief and causes confusion among
the courts); Note, The Purchaser-Seller Limitation to SEC Rule lOb-5, 53 CORNELL L. REv. 684,
697-99 (1968) (the doctrine arbitrarily bars potential plaintiffs from relief).
25. The decisions may be divided logically into two separate categories: (1) decisions in which
the court granted standing even though the plaintiff was not a purchaser or seller of securities, and
(2) decisions in which the court broadly interpreted "purchaser" and "seller" to include parties
involved in nontraditional purchases and sales.
For a listing of cases in the first category, see Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 492 F.2d
136 (9th Cir.) (potential purchasers of stock of a newly formed corporation granted standing when
an antitrust consent decree required the newly formed corporation to offer its stock to them), rev'd,
421 U.S. 723 (1975). For a listing of cases in the second category, see Superintendent of Ins. v.
Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971) (personal representative of purchaser or seller).
In 1971, the Supreme Court in Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6
(1971), echoed the liberal second approach, stating that § 10(b) must be read flexibly rather than
restrictively. Id. at 12-13. Although the purchaser-seller requirement was not an issue on appeal,
the Court cited authority opposed to the rule. Id. at 14 n.10.
26. 421 U.S. 723 (1975). Pursuant to an antitrust consent decree, Blue Chip Stamps distributed
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fronted the issue of the purchaser-seller requirement. In reaching its de-
cision to uphold the Birnbaum doctrine,27 the Court examined the
legislative and administrative history of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5,
finding inconclusive support for the Birnbaum doctrine.2" Although rec-
ognizing that the doctrine might preclude meritorious claims,2 9 the
Court concluded that the doctrine would prevent strike suits and would
eliminate the need to inquire into plaintiffs' subjective decisions to invest
or sell.3" Additionally, the Court concluded that the language of the
1934 Act mandated the adoption of the Birnbaum doctrine.31
Congress expressly defined the terms "purchase" and "sale" in the
1934 Act. 32 The Court in Blue Chip Stamps, however, failed to provide
a prospectus offering shares of common stock to retail users who were not stockholders in the com-
pany. Id. at 726. Manor Drug Stores filed a class action on behalf of all former users, alleging that
Blue Chip Stamps distributed an overly pessimistic prospectus, thereby inducing class members not
to purchase the stock. Id
27. For a general discussion of Blue Chip Stamps and its effect upon the purchaser-seller re-
quirement, see Note, supra note 20, at 154-59.
28. 421 U.S. at 733. See also I A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD § 2.2 (Supp. 1970)
(the House and Senate Committee Reports provide little help in determining legislative intent);
Whittaker, The Birnbaum Doctrine" An Assessment, 23 ALA. L. REv. 543, 584 (1971) (the history of
§ 10(b) is inconclusive).
29. 421 U.S. at 738. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
30. 421 U.S. at 739-43. The Court found that absent a purchase or sale requirement, the dan-
ger of vexatious litigation existed. Id First, the evidence of a plaintiff's injury in a rule lOb-5 claim
is often subjective. Id. Second, the outcome of the trial may hinge on unreliable oral testimony. Id.
The Court feared that these factors might lead to speculative recovery. Id. In addition, the subjec-
tive nature of a rule lOb-5 claim makes summary judgment difficult to achieve, thereby forcing
defendants to settle unworthy claims in order to escape time-consuming discovery. Id. For criti-
cism of the Supreme Court's policy arguments in Blue Chip Stamps, see Note, supra note 20, at 142-
45 (criticizing the Court's policy argument as being the weakest link in the argument in support of
the purchaser-seller requirement).
31. 421 U.S. at 733 n.5 (noting that "the wording of § 10(b), making fraud in connection with
purchase orsale of security a violation of the Act, is surely badly strained when construed to provide
a cause of action, not to purchasers or sellers of securities, but to the world at large" (emphasis in
original)).
32. The 1934 Act provides that "[the terms 'buy' and 'purchase' each include any contract to
buy, purchase, or otherwise acquire." 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(13) (1982). Additionally, the 1934 Act
provides that "[t]he terms 'sale' and 'sell' each include any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of."
15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(14) (1982).
Notably, Congress adopted an apparently broader definition of "sale" in the 1933 Act: "(t]he
term 'sale' or 'sell' shall include every contract of sale or disposition of a security or interest in a
security, for value." 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1982). In Lawrence v. SEC, 398 F.2d 276, 280 (1st Cir.
1968), the court noted that with respect to the 1934 Act definition of "sale," there is "no reason to
believe that Congress intended, one year after passage of the [1933 Act], to dilute the concept of sale
in the [1934 Act]."
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guidelines for interpreting these statutory definitions.33
Faced with diverse factual situations, many courts construed the statu-
tory definitions of "purchase" and "sale" broadly to effectuate the reme-
dial purpose of the 1934 Act.34 Other courts have held that the terms
"purchase" and "sale" should not be limited to their common-law mean-
ing.35 Accordingly, courts developed "qualifications" 36 to the Birnbaum
doctrine, granting standing to plaintiffs in numerous nontraditional sale
situations.37
In Northland Capital Corp. v. Silver,38 the District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals addressed the meaning of the terms "purchase" and
"sale" in an unusual fact situation. 39 Focusing on the words "any con-
tract" in the statutory definitions of "purchase" and "sale,"'  the court
33. The Court apparently rejected the judicially developed exceptions to the rule created
through case-by-case policy analysis. Id. at 755.
34. See infra note 38. The decision in Mansbach v. Prescott Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017 (6th
Cir. 1979), illustrates the broad construction of purchase and sale adopted by many courts. In
Mansbach, the plaintiff pledged stock to a securities broker as collateral for anticipated transactions.
Id. at 1019. The court held that a pledge of securities was a "purchase and sale" under § 10(b) and
rule lOb-5. Id. at 1028. After carefully considering the particular facts of the case and the policy
concerns expressed in Blue Chip Stamps, the court concluded that the pledge of securities constituted
a "sale" under rule 10b-5. Id. at 1030.
Several courts have focused on the extent of the plaintiff's control of the security. These courts
reason that a purchase or sale occurs upon a nongratuitous "surrendering of control, change in
ownership, or change in the fundamental nature of an investment." Sacks v. Reynolds Securities,
Inc., 593 F.2d 1234, 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978); see also Baurer v. Planning Group, Inc., 669 F.2d 770,
777 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (a purchase of a security occurred because "notes were. . . disposed of.").
35. See, eg., Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 614 F.2d 418, 435 (5th Cir. 1980), afl'd on other
grounds and rev'd in part on other grounds, 642 F.2d 929 (5th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
965 (1981); Sacks v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 593 F.2d 1234, 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Goodman v.
Epstein, 582 F.2d 388, 410 (7th Cir. 1978); Vine v. Beneficial Finance Co., 374 F.2d 627, 634 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967). But cf Radiation Dynamics, Inc. v. Goldmuntz, 464 F.2d
876 (2d Cir. 1972) (court relied upon common-law principle of meeting of the minds to determine
when purchase was made).
36. A broad interpretation of the statutory terms "purchase" and "sale" for purposes of rule
lOb-5 is sometimes referred to as a qualification.
37. In the context of rule lOb-5, factual situations which do not constitute sales under strict
common law are commonly referred to as nontraditional sales. See, e.g., Alley v. Miramon, 614
F.2d 1372, 1380-81, 1384-85 (5th Cir. 1980) (liquidation constitutes forced sale); Mallis v. Federal
Deposit Ins. Corp., 568 F.2d 824, 828-30 (2d Cir. 1977) (pledgor of a security held to be a seller);
Bolton v. Gramlick, 540 F. Supp. 822, 839-40 (S.D. N.Y. 1982) (liquidation constitutes forced sale);
Valente v. Pepsico, 454 F. Supp. 1228, 1236-37 (D. Del. 1978) (merger constitutes forced sale). But
see National Bank of Commerce v. All American Assurance Co., 583 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1978)
(pledge is not a purchase or sale).
38. 735 F.2d 1421 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
39. See supra notes 3-9 and accompanying text.
40. See supra note 32 (defining "purchase" and "sale").
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held that absent an enforceable contract of sale, the parties have not en-
gaged in a transaction "in connection with the purchase or sale" of a
security.41
Judge Starr, writing for the majority, first discussed Blue Chip Stamps,
concluding that the Supreme Court based its adoption of the Birnbaum
doctrine principally upon the language of the 1934 Act.42 The fear of
vexatious litigation and of abuse of federal jurisdiction that was ex-
pressed in Blue Chip Stamps, Judge Starr reasoned, were secondary con-
siderations to the Court's holding.4 3 He thus rejected Northland's
argument that the court should balance the fear of vexatious litigation
against the need for protection from fraud on a case-by-case basis.44
Turning to the issue of Northland's standing under rule lOb-5, Judge
Starr concluded that a "meeting of the minds' 45 between the purchaser
and seller with respect to the essential terms of their agreement is a re-
quirement for a "purchase" or "sale."4 6 Judge Starr pointed to several
facts that precluded the formation of a contract: the parties failed to
close as provided by their agreement;47 neither the wiring of funds by
Northland nor the delivery of securities by Watkins constituted an offer
and acceptance; and finally, the agreement provided that a group of in-
vestors, not Northland alone, would participate in the transaction.48 In
conclusion, Judge Starr argued that the federal securities laws do not
provide broad remedies for every injury an investment company may sus-
41. 735 F.2d at 1422. See supra note 2.
42. Id at 1426. See supra note 31.
43. Id See supra notes 26-33 and accompanying text (discussing Blue Chip Stamps).
44. Id.
45. The concept of a meeting of the minds, commonly known as mutual assent, is a require-
ment for the formation of a contract under strict contract law. See, e-g., Fairway Center Corp. v.
V.I.P. Corp., 502 F.2d 1135, 1141 (8th Cir. 1974) (contract not binding for lack of mutual assent
when parties separately sign varying versions of agreement); Christian v. Waialua Agricultural Co.,
94 F.2d 806, 807 (9th Cir.), rev'd, 305 U.S. 91 (1938) (contract not binding because insane person
cannot give the required assent). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTrS § 17
(1979) (providing that "the formation of a contract requires a bargain in which there is a manifesta-
tion of mutual assent to the exchange and a consideration.").
46. 735 F.2d at 1427.
47. Id. at 1428. The court argued that by expressly authorizing Allied to act on its behalf at the
contemplated closing, Northland signified that it considered a successful closing to be a prerequisite
to any transaction.
48. Although recognizing that Northland and Watkins could have struck a separate agreement,
Judge Starr concluded that they failed to do so. Northland's ministerial act of wiring funds did not
constitute an offer from Northland to Watkins. Even if such an act were an offer, Watkins never
accepted it because Northland failed to sign the written agreement and contemplated materially
different terms on an essential item of the contract. Id at 1428-29.
[Vol. 63:297
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tain while attempting to negotiate and close a deal.49
In his dissent, Judge Wald criticized the majority's restrictive reading
of the purchase and sale requirement.5" In particular, he criticized the
majority for ignoring the 1933 Act's definition of "sale," which provides
that "sale" includes any "disposition of. . . an interest in a security, for
value."51 According to Judge Wald, Congress could not have intended,
one year after passing the 1933 Act, to dilute the concept of "sale" in the
1934 Act.52 Additionally, Judge Wald argued that Blue Chip Stamps
mandates a balancing of various policy considerations to determine
whether a person has standing under rule lOb-5.53 The majority, there-
fore, failed to comply with Blue Chip Stamps.54
The Northland court's holding is unwise and unprecedented. Nearly
all courts have adopted extremely liberal interpretations, in nontradi-
tional sale situations, of the statutory terms "purchase" and "sale."55 Ig-
noring precedent, the majority relied exclusively on strict tenets of
contract law.56
49. Id. at 1431. Moreover, Judge Starr stressed that imposing strict contract rules on determi-
nations whether a purchase or sale has occurred would not undermine the broad remedial purposes
of the federal securities laws. Id Judge Starr reasoned that the cause of Northland's injury was its
failure to escrow the funds until closing rather than any violation of the securities laws. Id.
50. Id. at 1432.
51. Id. at 1433. See supra note 32.
52. Stating that Congress in the 1933 Act defined "sale" as a "disposition of. . . an interest in
a security for value," 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3), Judge Wald argued that Congress clearly intended to cover
transactions like that between Northland and Watkins. 735 F.2d at 1433.
53. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
54. Judge Wald noted that the Supreme Court turned to policy considerations to ascertain
those portions of the law that neither congressional enactment nor administrative regulations con-
clusively interpreted. 735 F.2d at 1434.
Judge Wald argued that because the exchange of money and securities between Northland and
Watkins was both objective and verifiable, a court would not have to engage in a subjective inquiry
to determine whether a purchase or sale occurred. Judge Wald thus concluded that the Blue Chip
Stamps concerns did not counsel against granting standing in this case. Id. at 1434-35.
Finally, Judge Wald criticized the majority opinion for "imposing its own 'meeting of the minds'
prerequisite to a 'purchase or sale' under the Act" and thus shielding "from the investor protection
provisions of the Securities Exchange Act the very kind of fraudulent conduct which was a core
concern of the drafters." Id at 1431-32. Judge Wald noted that several circuits have recognized the
remedial policies of the 1934 Act and, accordingly, have granted standing to plaintiffs in situations
much less recognizable as traditional sales than the facts of this case. Judge Wald argued that the
majority's meeting-of-the-minds requirement conflicts with such holdings. For example, a merger or
liquidation's conversion of a stockholder's shares into cash involves no meeting of the minds because
the stockholder does not agree to transfer the stock for a bargained price. Id. at 1435.
55. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
56. See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
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The majority's strict adherence to common-law contract principles
fails to recognize Blue Chip Stamps' policy concerns.5 7 The majority's
failure to consider such concerns in its analysis therefore reflects a mis-
taken departure from the teachings of Blue Chip Stamps.
By focusing on a meeting-of-the-minds requirement as a prerequisite to
a purchase and sale under rule lOb-5, the majority mandates an inquiry
in every case into the enforceability of the contract underlying the sale of
the security. The court therefore requires analysis of the subjective
thought processes of the parties-the very type of inquiry that Blue Chip
Stamps seeks to avoid." Rather, courts should consider Blue Chip
Stamps' policy concerns, scrutinizing the facts of the case in light of
those concerns. In the instant case, no sound reason exists to deny
Northland standing to sue. An objective and verifiable event such as the
parties' exchange of money and securities59 presents no danger of strike
suits or undesirable inquiries into the plaintiff's subjective decision to in-
vest or sell. The court should have granted Northland standing to sue
under rule lOb-5.
In refusing to grant the plaintiff standing to sue in Northland Capital
Corp., the District of Columbia Circuit took a wayward step from the
judicial effort to liberally construe a purchase or sale under rule 10b-5. 6°
By adopting a restrictive approach in such a context, the court under-
mined the remedial purposes of the federal securities laws.
J.G.B.
57. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
58. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
59. See supra notes 3-9 and accompanying text.
60. Recently, in Landreth Timber Company v. Landreth, 105 S. Ct. 2313 (1985), the Supreme
Court firmly rejected the so-called "sale of business" doctrine, thereby broadening the potential
scope of the federal securities laws. The District of Columbia Circuit's restrictive interpretation of
"purchase" and "sale" appears out of step with the Supreme Court's recent trend toward broadening
the availability of the federal securities laws.
[Vol. 63:297
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